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SELF-DETERMINATION: INDIANS AND THE UNITED
NATIONS-THE ANOMALOUS STATUS OF
AMERICA'S "DOMESTIC DEPENDENT NATIONS"
Judith L. Andress*
and
James E. Falkowski**
Some American Indian nations have always asserted that they
are independent nations.' Other Indian groups have only recently
redeclared their right to self-government. 2 The United States,
however, has denied their rights and instead subjected Native
Americans to a domestic trust.3
The United States government as trustee has proven unable to
protect Indian interests. Indeed, the domestic trust has been
aimed at detroying Indian self-government.' Furthermore, the
domestic trust is flawed by the trustee's lack of accountability. 5
These inadequacies necessitate the search for an alternative.
The best alternative is available through the application of the
international trust principles in the United Nations Charter .6 The
ultimate objective of the international trust is the development of
self-government .7 The international trust system's supervisory
provisions also promote accountability.' Such provisions provide
* J.D. expected 1982, University of California Law School, Davis.
** J.D. expected 1982, University of California Law School, Davis.
I. Most notably the Six Nations Confederacy, who petitioned the League of Na-
tions for membership in 1923, Deskaheh (Six Nations Indian Museum Series, published
by Akwesasne Notes), and the United Nations in 1977. Legal Commission Report, 3 Am.
IND. J., no. 11, at 9 (1977). The Six Nations Confederacy consists of the Seneca, Cayuga,
Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk, and Tuscarora nations.
2. Most notably the Oglala Sioux at Wounded Knee. Oglala Sovereignty Reaf-
firmed, 5 AKWESASNE NOTES No. 1, at 32 (1973).
3. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823). Implicit in the
noninternational law analysis is the assumption that Indians are an inferior race. See L.
HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS: A STUDY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN THE
MODERN VORLD (1975); J. SEPULVEDA, DEMOCRATES SEGUNDA DE LAw JUsTAs DE LA
GUERRA CONTRA Los INDIOS (1951); Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal
Title Reconsidered, 31 HAST. L.J. 1215 (1980); Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal
Rights in the Early History of the United States, 27 BUF. L. REv. 637 (1977). For an inter-
national law analysis of Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra, see R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE
ROAD 45-46 (1980). See also note 24 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 45-74 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 75-83 infra.
6. U.N. Charter art. 73-91.
7. Id., arts. 73(b), 76(b).
8. Id., arts. 73(e), 87.
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for the transmission of information to the United Nations so that
violations of trust duties may be exposed to world opinion. 9
This note will discuss the unique development and grave in-
adequacies of the domestic trust relationship between Native
Americans and the United States. It will outline the international
trust provisions of the United Nations Charter, and it will con-
clude that the recognition of Indians by the United Nations, in
some capacity, affords a just and proper solution to the problems
inherent in the domestic trust.
Origin of the Domestic Trust Relationship
The seminal case on the status of Indians in the United States
is Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.'° The controversy concerned a
jurisdictional dispute between the state of Georgia and the
Cherokee Nation of Indians. In the 1791 Treaty of Holsten the
United States "solemnly guaranteed to the Cherokee Nation, all
their lands not hereby ceded."" In 1802, Georgia ceded its claims
to western lands to the United States on the condition that the
United States extinguish Indian title to the lands within the
borders of the state "as soon as it could be done peaceably and
on reasonable terms."' 2
In 1827 the Cherokee Nation adopted a written constitution
that reasserted its status as a sovereign power."' The Cherokees
also resolved not to sell any more of their land.' 4 In reaction to
this, and to the discovery of gold on the Cherokees' territory, the
state of Georgia passed a series of laws that interfered with the
Cherokees' sovereign rights that were guaranteed by treaty."
9. "Despite the harsh realities of power politics world opinion is a force to be
reckoned with." Dr. Abram, the former United States representative on the Commission
on Human Rights, as quoted in R. CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS 92 (1972). See also Eggleston, Prospects for United Nations Protection of
the Human Rights of Indigenous Minorities, 1970-73 AuSTL. Y.B. iNT'L L. 68.
10. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) See also Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law,
Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1968-69); Swindler, Politics as Law: The
Cherokee Cases, 3 AM. IND. L. REv. 7 (1975).
11. 7 Stat. 43.
12. Georgia Cession, Apr. 26, 1802, in I AERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS
126 (1832).
13. For the constitution, see H.R. Doc. No. 91, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1827).
14. The Cherokees put into writing a traditional law imposing the death penalty
upon anyone selling Cherokee land without "special permission from the national
authorities." T. WILKINS, CHEROKEE TRAGEDY (1970).
15. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13-14 (1831). See also Act No. 545, Dec. 20, 1828, and Act
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These Georgia laws distributed Cherokee territory among several
Georgia counties, nullified all Cherokee laws, and declared that
Georgia laws would be enforced within Cherokee territory.'
6
The Cherokees sought to enjoin the enforcement of these
Georgia laws and to have them declared void as violations of the
Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States.' 7 The
Cherokees sought original jurisdiction before the Supreme Court
as a "foreign state" under article III of the Constitution.' 8 The
Supreme Court declined to decide the case on its merits because
the Cherokees were "not a foreign state, in the sense of the Con-
stitution," '9 and thus the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdic-
tion. The Court created a new category in its finding that Indians
were "domestic dependent nations."20
Although Justice Marshall found that the Cherokees did have
the attributes of a foreign nation, within the international sense
of the term, 2' he concluded that they were not a foreign nation
within the meaning of article 111.22 Justice Marshall concluded
that the Cherokees could not be considered "foreign" because
they occupied territory within the borders of the United States .23
However, under recognized principles of international law ap-
plicable to enclaves, territorial position was not dispositive. 24 The
No. 546, Dec. 19, 1829, in A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 198,
(W. Dawson comp. 1831).
16. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 15 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. 3 § 2).
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 16: "They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of
our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them
as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in
their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community.
Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our governnment plain-
ly recognize the Cherokee Nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts." See
also note 94 infra.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Justice Johnson's concurring opinion distinguished the Cherokees from the
European enclaves on the basis of the American version of the doctrine of discovery,
which placed Indian enclaves "a grade below the enclaves of Europe." Id. at 27. Under
this version of discovery Indian title has been described as "permission from the whites to
occupy." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). Justice Johnson
proposed a limitation to this doctrine whereby the Indians' adoption of "a more fixed
state of society" would destroy any rights obtained by discovery, and Indians could then
19801
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dissent found the Cherokees to be "foreign" by applying the
judicially developed test of whether a nation is a separate and
distinct jurisdiction .15
Justice Marshall also found that the protection language of
treaties with the Cherokees precluded any consideration of them
as an independent nation.2 6 The dissent disputed this interpreta-
tion and noted that such protection arrangements were common
among independent nations.2
The most important aspect of the Cherokee Nation decision,
nevertheless, is that it laid the foundation for the United States'
trust relationship with Indians.28 This domestic trust grew out of
Justice Marshall's description of the Indians as persons "in a
state of pupilage," whose "relation to the United States resem-
bles that of a ward to his guardian." '2 9 Although Justice Mar-
shall cited no authority for this analogy, he apparently derived
the language from the same source from which the international
trust developed.3" Although both the domestic and the interna-
tional trust have a common derivation, they evolved into separate
be able to own land. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). This limitation has never been followed,
and the rights of Indians are still constrained by discovery. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discovery limits Indian jurisdiction over non-
Indians on Indian land). Currently existing enclaves include Lesotho, San Marino,
Vatican City, Singapore, Monaco, and Gambia. V. DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF
BROKEN TREATIES 169 (1974).
25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 57 (1831).
26. Id. at 17-18.
27. Id. at 53.
28. See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to in-
dians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1975).
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
30. Justice Marshall was influenced by the writings of Edmund Burke, who for-
mulated the "trusteeship" concept of colonialism. 2 A. BEVERRIDGE. THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 10-12 (1919); WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA, HISTORICAL VOLUME 1607-1896, at
404 (rev. ed. 1967). Burke expressed the trusteeship principle as follows: "All political
power which is set over men, and ... all privilege claimed or exercised in exclusion of
them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural equality of
mankind at large, ought to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit.
If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion, and every description of
commercial privilege, none of which can be original self-derived rights, or grants for the
benefit of the holders, then such rights or privileges, or whatever else you choose to call
them, are all, in the strictest sense, a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be
rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies from the pur-
poses for which alone it could have a lawful existence." 23 HANSARD. PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY. COIs. 1316-17, (1783), quoted in C. TOUSSAINT, TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 6 (1956).
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systems with opposite goals." The unique development of the
domestic trust between the United States and American Indians,
and its inadequacies, are discussed in the following section.
Development and Inadequacies of the Domestic Trust
Although Cherokee Nation created the domestic trust, it
established neither the domestic trust's objectives nor the scope
of the domestic trust's powers and duties. These aspects of the
domestic trust emerged from the evolution of case and statutory
law.
The first case to define the domestic trust's objectives was
Cherokee Nation's companion case, Worcester v. Georgia.32 In
being appealed through the Georgia state courts, Worcester
avoided the jurisdictional issue that had prevented Cherokee Na-
tion from being decided on its merits. 3 The issue in Worcester
was whether the Georgia laws extending state jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory were unconstitutional as incompatible with
treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the federal govern-
ment.3" The Supreme Court found that the Georgia laws were
void and established that the federal government's power over In-
dians were exclusive. 35
The rationale for this exclusivity was developed in a later case:
"They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies." ' 36
Thus, one objective of the domestic trust was determined: the
federal government had a duty to protect the Indians from the
states.
The scope of federal power over Indians did not come before
the Supreme Court until more than fifty years later, in Ex parte
Crow Dog.37 Crow Dog had killed Spotted Tall on Indian land;
after being punished according to tribal law, 38 he was convicted
31. Justice Marshall found "the relation of the Indians to the United States .. .
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else," 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
at 15, although analogous situations have existed elsewhere. See notes 45, 85, 155 and ac-
companying text, infra.
32. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
33. Id. at 535.
34. Id. at 520-35.
35. Id. at 559-62.
36. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
37. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
38. See G. HYDE, SPOWrED TAIL'S FOLK: A HISTORY OF THE BRULE SIOUX 152, 307
1980]
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of murder in the federal district court.39 Crow Dog filed for
habeas corpus on the ground that federal criminal jurisdiction did
not extend to crimes committed by an Indian against another
Indian on Indian land."' The government argued that the Sioux
had subjected themselves to general federal laws by a treaty in
1868.'
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sioux Nation. 42 "The pledge to secure to these people,
with whom the United States was contracting as a distinct
political body, an orderly government ... necessarily implies...
self-government."41 3 Indians could not be brought within the
whites' legal system because "it tries them not by their peers, nor
by the customs of their people, nor by the laws of their land, but
by superiors of a different race." ' 44
Congress reacted to the Crow Dog decision by enacting the
Seven Major Crimes Act that extended federal jurisdiction over
Indians. 4' The Act's constitutionality was challenged in United
States v. Kagama.4 The Act was upheld based upon the federal
government's trust responsibility. 47 The Indians were regarded as
wards and thus incompetent. Accordingly, the federal govern-
ment as trustee had a duty, and hence the power, to protect
them.48 The Supreme Court thus found the domestic trust rela-
tionship itself to be the source of federal power over Indians.
Kagama rested upon a misinterpretation of the 1871 congres-
sional act that discontinued treaty-making with Indians. 49 By that
act, Indian relations with the United States were thereafter to be
governed by agreements." Agreements were to differ from for-
(1961) (Under the Sioux system of compensatory justice the murderer was required to pay
blood money to the victim's family.)
39. Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
40. Id. at 557.
41. Id. at 562.
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 568.
44. Id. at 571.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). The expansion of interference with the internal affairs
of Indians followed the familiar pattern of colonialism that occured in Africa. M.
LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 182 (1926).
46. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
47. Id. at 384.
48. Id.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970).
50. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 67 (1945).
[Vol. 8
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mal treaties only in requiring ratification by both houses of Coh-
gress instead of by the Senate alone."
Mutual consent was to remain the basis for dealings between
the federal government and Indians." Kagama construed the
1871 act to have departed from the policy of dealing with Indians
on the basis of consent. Henceforth the United States was to
govern Indians "by acts of Congress." '5 3
The scope of the federal government's power over Indians was
before the Supreme Court in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.5" The
Comanches and Kiowas had signed a treaty that expressly forbid
the sale of any more of their land without Indian consent.55 Con-
gress passed a statute that authorized the sale of such land
without Indian consent. 56 Lone Wolf sued to enjoin the enforce-
ment of the statute on the ground that it conflicted with the trea-
ty's express prohibition."
The Supreme Court upheld the statute because Congress'
power over Indians was plenary and not subject to limitation by
treaty.5 8 The Court reasoned that the power over Indians must
belong to the federal government because "it has never existed
anywhere else." 5 9 The Supreme Court thus ignored the existence
of the Indians' retained rights plainly guaranteed by treaty.
In Lone Wolf the Supreme Court allowed Congress' unilateral
abrogation of Indian treaties, despite the federal-Indian trust rela-
tionship. The congressional power of unilateral abrogation of trea-
ties is well established in the domestic courts of the United States, 60
although such abrogations violate international law.61
51. Id.
52. Id. Cohen stated that "while the form of treaty-making no longer obtains, the
fact that Indian tribes are governed primarily on a basis established by common agree-
ment remains, and is likely to remain so long as the Indian tribes maintain their existence
and the Federal Government maintains the traditional democratic faith that all Govern-
ment derives its just powers from the consent of the governed."
53. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886).
54. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
55. Id. at 553.
56. Id. at 560.
57. Id. at 561.
58. Id. at 565. Although not cited, the first mention of Congress' plenary power was
in dicta in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 44 (1831). Congress' power
was based upon Indian land being within the territory of the United States according to
the American version of the doctrine of discovery. See note 3 supra.
59. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903), quoting United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
60. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S.
589, 597 (1884).
61. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (the breach of a treaty by an act of Congress
19801
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The ultimate objectives of the domestic "trust developed by
Congress were the dissolution of'Indian self-government and the
forced assimilation of Indian nations into mainstream American
society. 2 The General Allotment Act was the first major step
toward these goals.63
Under the Act, tribally owned Indian land was broken up and
assigned to each Indian as an individually owned parcel.64 The
United States was to hold title to the allotted parcels in trust for
twenty-five years, after which an Indian would, if declared com-
petent, receive fee title. 65 After being declared competent the In-
dian became a citizen subject to the laws of the state in which he
resided; thus Indian self-government would be extinguished.
66
Unallotted Indian lands, deemed "surplus," were sold in fee to
non-Indians. 6
The General Allotment Act had predictable results. Previous
experiments with allotments had been acknowledged disasters for
Indians.6 8 Under the Act, the Indians' land base was reduced by
almost two-thitds before Congress admitted the failure of the Act
and halted the alienation of Indian land.69
is subject to the "law of nations"). In 1977 there was a bill before Congress to "abrogate
all treaties entered into by the United States with Indian tribes." H.R. 9054, reprinted in
3 Am. IND. J., No. 10, at 25. See also Thomson, Federal Indian Policy: A Violation of
International Treaty Law, 4 W.S.U.L. REv. 229 (1976-77).
62. "The dominant policy of the Federal Government towards the American Indian
has been one of coercive assimilation." Special Senate Subcomm. on Indian Education,
Indian Education: A National Tragedy-A National Challenge, S. REP. No. 501, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1969), reprinted in Gross, Indian Self-Determination and tribal
Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Indian Policy, 56 Tax. L. REV. 1195, 1198
(1978). See also H. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION (1963).
63. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 et. seq. (1970).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
65. 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 352a (1970). This violated the common law trust principle that
the guardian may never have an interest or inheritance in the ward's estate, which would
be like entrusting the lamb to the wolf, to be devoured. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON,
THE ROAD 55 (1980).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970). See also D. OTIs, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT
OF INDIAN LANDS (1973); J. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST-A CIVILIZATION WON (1937);
W. vASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT LAW
(DAWES ACT) OF 1887 (1975).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
68. L. PRIEST, UNCLE SAM'S STEPCHILDREN 177 (1942); P. GATES, INDIAN
ALLOTMENTS PRECEDING THE DAWES ACT (1971).
69. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 216 (1945). See also K. KICKINGBIRD & K.
DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (1973).
[Vol. 8
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After a temporary suspension of the forced assimilation
policy,7" it was again reimplemented by the termination policy of
the 1950s. 7 ' Termination differed from the Allotment Act in
form only; the ultimate objective remained the same. Termina-
tion ended all of the federal government's obligations to Indians,
dissolved Indian governments, and incorporated Indians within
the states where they resided.
Present congressional policy has purportedly rejected the ter-
mination policy and initiated a policy of increasing Indian control
of Indian education programs, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior." This policy is misleadingly called the
self-determination policy.73 Moreover, the tormination policy
could be reimplemented at any time because legislation is always
subject to repeal.74
70. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version in scat-
tered sections of 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1976).
71. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. Rc. 9968 (1953) (House ap-
proval), 99 CONG. REC. 10815 (Senate approval) (1953). See also Wilkinson & Biggs, The
Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REv. 139 (1977); Menominee Ter-
mination: From Reservation to Colony, 31 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 257 (Fall 1972); A.
Watkins, Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian
Property and Person, 311 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOCIAL SCIENCE 47
(May 1957).
72. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub.
L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 452, 455-458e (1976). See also
Barsh & Trosper, Title I of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
of 1975, 3 AM. IND. L. REv. 361 (1975); Ericson & Snow, The Indian Battle for Self-
Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1970); Clute, Indians' Right to Self-
Determination, 22 BUF. L. REv. 985 (1972-73); Gross, Indian Self-Determination and
Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Indian Policy, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1195
(1978).
73. In international law the right to self-determination means the "right freely to
determine without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." Declaration on the Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28)
121, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) at 123; "The exercise of this right could, of course, result
in a decision for something other than independence: free association or even integration
with another state. But the choice between these legitimate forms of decolonization must
always be the 'result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with
full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through
informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult
suffrage.'" Franck & Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8
N.Y. U.J. IN'L L. POL. 331, 339-40 (1975-76) (citation omitted).Under the domestic trust
integration is the only "alternative" open to Indians.
74. "[T]he history of federal-Indian relations ... reflects a self-defeating, zigzag
course of constantly altering programs, all of them designed to lead to Indian assimila-
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1980
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Yet another major deficiency of the domestic trust is the
federal government's lack of accountability as trustee." One re-
cent example is United States v. Mitchell.76 In Mitchell the
Quinault Indians sought money damages from the United States
for the mismanagement 6f timber resources on land held in trust
by the United States as a result of the General Allotment Act. 7
The Court of Claims held that the language of the Allotment Act
created an express trust relationship under which money damages
for mismanagement were recoverable." The Supreme Court
reversed, finding only a "limited trust" relationship that does not
impose any duty upon the government to manage trust lands. 79
The Supreme Court has justified federal power over Indians by
the implication of a trust relationship.8 0 However, on the issue of
duties owed to Indians, the Court held express trust language in a
congressional statute to be insufficient to establish standard trust
duties. 8'
The General Allotment Act is one of the clearest examples of
the creation of a trust relationship with Indians. However, the
Supreme Court requires not only express trust language but also
a clear recitation of the remedies available for a breach of trust
duties."2 Mitchell's practical result is that there will rarely be a
remedy available for acknowledged breaches of trust duties. The
dissent recognized that this standard offers "little to deter federal
officials from violating their trust duties ... ."I
tion, rather than to the establishment of. . . self-governing . . .Indian communities." A.
JOSEPHY. THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 348 (1968).
75. See, for example, Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations
Under U.S. Law, 3 AM. IND. J. No. 9, at 5 (1977); American Indian Child Welfare Crisis:
Cultural Genocide or First Amendment Preservation?, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
529 (1976); Resource Exploitation: The Cutting Edge of Genocide, 10 AKWESASNE NOTES,
No. 2, at 9: Killing our Future Sterilization and Experiments, 9 AKWESASNE NOTES, No. I,
at 4 (sterilization of Indian women "generally not in compliance with" government
regulations requiring informed consent, or misinformation, or duress).
76. 445 U.S. 535 (1980). See also Trust Theory Axed-Almost-U.S. vs Mitchell, 12
AKWESASNE NOTES, No. 2, at 20.
77. 445 U.S. 535, 541 (1980).
78. Id. at 542.
79. Id. at 550.
80. See text accompanying notes 10-61, supra.
81. The dissent would have found "that the Act creates a bona fide trust, imposes
fiduciary obligations on the United States ... and provides a damages remedy .... "445
U.S. 535, 550 (1980).
82. Id. at 542.
83. Id. at 550.
[Vol. 8
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Thus the domestic trust's inadequacies seem insoluble. Its
hallmarks are nonconsensual government, territorial aggrandize-
ment, constant policy vacillation, and lack of accountability.
These inadequacies require the search for alternatives if the rights
of Indian people are ever to be respected. These alternatives are
provided for by the United Nations Charter.
Alternatives to the Domestic Trust Available Through
the United Nations
The application of international law principles to American In-
dians is not a novel proposition. Vitoria in the sixteenth
century,14 and Phillimore in the nineteenth century, 5 advocated
this position. It has, more recently, been advanced by an increas-
ing number of writers.8 6
Under the United Nations Charter, Indians could be recog-
nized in any of three categories: (1) full membership,8 7 (2) the
trusteeship system,8" or (3) non-self-governing territory. 9 Each
alternative will be examined separately to distinguish significant
differences among them.
84. F. VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES § 3 tit. 18, at 161 (E. Nys
ed. 1971). See also G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (5th ed.
1967) (Vitoria "held that international law applied no less between Spain and the Indian
principalities in America than between Christian States").
85. Phillimore, after reviewing the works of earlier writers, concluded that "the
principles of international justice do govern, or ought to govern, the dealings of the
Christian with the Infidel Community. They are binding, for instance, upon Great Bri-
tain, in her intercourse with the native powers of India; upon France, with those of
Africa; upon Russia, in her relations with Persia or America; upon the United States of
North America, in their intercourse with the Native Indians. The violation of these prin-
ciples is indeed sometimes urged in support of an opposite opinion, but to no purpose;
for it is clear that the occasional vicious practice cannot affect the reality of the perma-
nent duty." R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 23 (3d ed., Lon-
don, 1879). See also LINDLEY, supra note 45, at 45-46.
86. Eggleston, supra note 9; The Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative
Analysis, 68 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 265 (1974); Ryan, Indian Nations Compared to
Other Nations, 3 AM. IND. J., No. 8, at 2 (1977); Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and
Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BuF.
L. REv. 669 (1978): Accommodation of Indian Treaty Rights in an International Fishery:
An International Program Begging for an International Solution, 54 WASH. L. REv. 403
(1979); G. HALL, THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 54 (1979). See also American
Indian Policy Review Comm'n Trust Responsibility Task Force Report at 87-112.
87. U.N. Charter art. 3-6.
88. Id. at art. 75-91.
89. Id. at art. 73-74.
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Full Membership
Full membership is the first alternative available to those In-
dian nations that have resisted the imposition of the domestic
trust.90 In international law the requirements for statehood are a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the
capacity to enter into relations with other states. ' Although some
American Indian nations still meet these requirements, 92 they
have not been recognized as members of the United Nations.(
However, a state's de facto existence does not guarantee its de
jure recognition because this is often a highly political question. 3
Recognition is important for various reasons. The basis of in-
ternational law is that through recognition states become mutual-
ly obligated to respect each other's fundamental rights.94 The
most comprehensive right of a state is the right to exist as a
sovereign political unit.5 Today, moreover, recognition entitles
states to bring violations of their rights before the International
Court of Justice. 9 Although immediate recognition of a small
90. See note 1 supra.
91. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 U.N. T. S. 19, at
25 (1936); 28 A.J.I.L. Supp. 75 (1934).
92. V. DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974). Although recognition in international law can be implied
from the negotiation of a bilateral treaty, 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 148
(1955), the procedure for United Nations membership is outlined in the Charter. U.N.
Charter art. 3-6.
93. For example, the United States recognized Panama three days after it revolted
from Columbia and recognized Israel a few hours after it proclaimed its independence. J.
BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 140 (6th ed. 1963). In contrast, the People's Republic of
China, with 1/5 of the world's population, was not recognized for almost 30 years. Legal
Implications of Recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, 72 Am. Soc'vy INT'L L.
PRoC. 246 (19-).
94. G. WILSON & G. TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 77 (1901). See also BRIERLY, supra
note 90, at 49.
95. G. WILSON & G. TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1901).
96. U.N. Charter art. 92-96. Only two Indian claims have been brought before inter-
national tribunals. In 1926, Great Britain brought a claim on behalf of the Cayuga In-
dians before the American and British Arbital Tribunal. The right of the Cayuga Indians
living on the Canadian side of the international border to annuities under a treaty with
the United States was held, although recovery was based upon the Treaty of Ghent be-
tween the United Staies and Great Britain. The Cayugas were determined to be "not a
legal unit of international law." Cayuga case (1926) 6 U.N. Reports of International Ar-
bital Awards at 173; XX A.J. 574, 577.
The only other attempt to come before an international tribunal was the Mohawk
Nation of the Grand River in Canada, who attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the In-
ternationa Court of Justice at the Hague. The Mohawks' complaint was dismissed on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action. 0. Ghobashy, The Claim of the Mohawk
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/6
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number of Indian nations is already merited, such recognition is
neither appropriate for nor desired by many Indian groups.97
Trusteeship System
The second alternative available through the United Nations is
the application of its trusteeship system.98 Although American In-
dians served as the model from which the international trust
evolved, 99 it has never been applied to them. The trusteeship
system was intended to cover three categories of territories:
former Mandates, former enemy territories, and "territories
voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their
administration.""'0 To date, only territories within the first two
categories have been placed under the system, although it has
been suggested that members have a moral obligation to effec-
tuate the third provision.' 01 Indians could appropriately be
brought within this third category. 02
Nation of the Grand River under the Haldimand Agreement (undated).
These claims should be seen as having very little precedential weight. Both the
Cayugas and the Mohawks belong to the Six Nations Confederacy, which might, perhaps,
have more appropriately brought the action. See note 1 supra. Moreover, the binding
authority that Anglo-American law attaches to precedents does not apply to decisions of
the International Court of Justice. BRIERLY, supra note 94, at 354.
The United States has also reserved from the present International Court of Justice's
jurisdiction "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United States. . . ." Yearbook,
1971-1972, [1972] I.C.J. 63. This reservation is of doubtful legality and has been con-
demned as being contrary to article 36(6) of the International Court's Statute. Article
36(6) expressly places the power to decide any dispute as to the court's jurisdiction in the
hands of the court itself. See BRIERLY, note 94, supra at 356-59.
97. See note 1 supra.
98. U.N. Charter art. 75-91.
99. The earliest concept of a trust over indigenous populations goes back to the six-
teenth-century writings of Vitoria with regard to the indigenous inhabitants of the New
World. See note 84 supra. In 1763 the Royal Proclamation of the British Government,
dealing with the lands in the New World, embodies this trust concept. In 1783, Edmund
Burke developed this trust concept into the "trusteeship" concept of colonialism upon
which the international trust is based. See note 30 supra. Under the League of Nations
covenant, the international trust was handled through the mandate system and the
"native inhabitants" provision. This developed into the trusteeship system and the non-
self-governing territories provision in the United Nations Charter. The United States
assumed "the role of a trustee in a species of international guardianship" with regard to
native populations under its control, from which only Indians were excluded. See Y. EL-
AYouTy, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION 47 (1971).
100. U.N. Charter art. 77.
101. India argued that it was the clear intention of the Charter that the trusteeship
system should apply to other non-self-governing territories besides former mandates. See
2 U.N. GAOR, Annex 51a, at 217-18 (106th plen. mtg.) 655-57.
102. The Supreme Court has found that "the Government ... under a humane and
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The effect of placing a territory under the trusteeship system is
merely to recognize the principle of international accountability
for the welfare of the territory's native inhabitants. 13 Historical-
ly, the lack of accountability of domestic trusts was the impetus
for the development of the international trust system. 104 Account-
ability is promoted through the United Nations' supervision,
which involves periodic visits, examination of annual reports sub-
mitted by the administering authority, and other actions in con-
formity with the trusteeship agreement.'10 These provisions pro-
vide no actual enforcement sanctions beyond the direction of
world attention to trust violations.' 0 6
The trust period is also temporary. The ultimate objective of
the international trusteeship system is the "progressive develop-
ment towards self-government or independence as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned
'2107
Applications of the trusteeship system to a territory is clearly
voluntary.1'0 It does not apply until the administering power
enters into a trust agreement.' 09 It can only be suggested,
therefore, that the application of the trusteeship system to some
Indian groups would be the most appropriate way for the United
States to discharge its trust reponsibility.'' °
Non -self-governing Territories Provision
The third alternative available through the United Nations is
the application of the non-self-governing territories provision.",
The distinction between the non-self-governing territories provi-
sion and the trusteeship system is important, for they differ
notably in their objectives, obligations, and application.
The objective of the non-self-governing territories provision is
self imposed policy . . . has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest respon-
sibility and trust." Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
103. C. TOusSIANT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11 (1956).
104. Id. at 3; E. SADY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DEPENDENT PEOPLES 3 (1956).
105. U.N. Charter art. 87. See TOUSSIANT, supra note 103, at 11, 179-99.
106. See note 9 supra.
107. U.N. Charter art. 76(b).
108. Id. at art. 75.
109. Id.
110. This status may be appropriate for about the fifty largest Indian reservations.
See table in V. DELORIA, supra note 92, at 166-68.
111. U.N. Charter art. 73-74.
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limited to the development of the native peoples' self-
government," 2 whereas the trusteeship system's objective is self-
government or independence." 3 This difference recognized that
some territories cannot become completely independent, yet
recognizes the need for international supervision.
The obligations under the two systems also differ markedly.
While the interests of the native inhabitants are paramount under
both systems," 4 the means of supervision differ. The only con-
crete obligation under the non-self-governing territories provision
is the transmission of information to the Secretary-General.'' s
There are no petitions, visits, or other supervisory provisions
such as may be required under the trusteeship system." '6
In addition, the application of the non-self-governing ter-
ritories provision applies automatically to all "territories whose
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government"
upon the acceptance of membership. "'" The trusteeship system, as
noted above, does not apply to a territory until the administering
power places it under the system through a trusteeship
agreement. " I8
During the early stages of the implementation of the non-self-
governing territories provision, U.N. members debated the issue
of which territories were to come within the scope of this provi-
sion. ", 9 Belgium contended that members undertook to report on
areas inhabited by natives or tribal groups under their jurisdic-
tion.'20 This position applied the international trust to cover in-
digenous peoples such as those living in Brazil, the United States,
and other American republics.' 1 On the issue of the United
States, Belgium stated: "There is no doubt that we could place the
states of America, from the moment when they acquired their in-
112. Id. art. 73.
113. Id. art. 76(b).
114. Id. arts. 73 and 76.
115. Id. art. 73(e).
116. Id. art. 87.
117. Id. art. 73. See TOussIANT, supra note 103, at 229.
118. Id. art. 75.
119. E. SADY, supra note 104, at 65-68; TOUSSIANT, supra note 103, at 236; Y. EL-
AyouTy, supra note 99, at 67.
120. Van Langenhove, The Idea of the Sacred Trust of Civilization With Regard to
the Less Developed Peoples (June 1951). See EL-AyouTY, supra note 99, 50-53. See also
Belgian Government Information Center. The Sacred Mission of Civilization: To Which
Peoples Should the Benefits Be Extended? The Belgian Thesis. New York: 1953.
121. Id.
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dependence, in the category of those who follow the continental
colonization policy.' ' 22
The United States suggested that the non-self-governing ter-
ritories provision should apply "to any territories administered by
a Member of the United Nations which do not enjoy the same
measure of self-government as the metropolitan area of that
Member.' '1 23 The United States also indicated that it had used a
purely pragmatic approach in selecting the territories on which it
would transmit information. 24 Although many other definitions
were proposed, 2 ' and a list of factors drawn up to serve as a
guide,' 2  none clarified the the issue of what territories are
covered by the non-self-governing territories provision. However,
122. Id. The Belgians regarded the salt-water theory of colonialism as a myth. The
Belgians found support for this position in the writings of Duncan Hall: "The idea that
expansion by seaways, in the same space of time and for the same kind of reasons, has
been of a quite different kind would have delighted a medieval schoolman." How wide,
he might have asked, must be the space of water before a territory ceased to be a detached
part of the mainland and became "overseas" and so was presumed to have become in-
capable of uniting politically with, or being assimilated to, the mother country? And he
could have made good play with little-known facts of geography. Newfoundland, he
could have pointed out, had a better claim to be regarded as "Overseas Britain" than
Hawaii as "Overseas America." The latter was 2,400 statute miles from the American
mainland and its population is preponderantly Asiatic and Polynesian. Newfoundland, on
the other hand, was wholly British in population-and only 2,300 statute miles away from
the mother country. The questioner might have gone on to ask, if the debate had been
rather later than 1939, "What did land and sea distances matter anyhow in the air age
when no point on the planet was separated from another by more than sixty hours-or
had it ..already dropped to thirty?' " H. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND
TRUSTEESHIP 43 (1948). See also Cohen, Colonialism: U.S. Style, THE PROGRESSIVE,
(Feb. 1951) at 16: Enamored with Colonization: Isaac McCoy's Plan of Indian Reform,
38 KANSAS HisT. Q. 268 (Autumn 1972); Colonialism-Canadian Style, 10 AKWESAsNE
NOTES, No. 1, at 16; U.S. Colonialism and the Hopi Nation, I1 AKWESASNE NOTES, No.
2, at 13.
The General Assembly resolved, "that prima facia there is an obligation to transmit
information in respect to a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it." Resolution 1541 XV
December 15, 1960, reprinted in L. GOODRICH, THE U.N. IN A CHANGING WORLD, at 195.
At least two Indian nations are islands: the Squaxin Nation in Puget Sound, and the
Metlakahtla Indians of the Annette Islands in Alaska. See Ryan, supra note 86, nn.134
and 138.
123. 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 17, p. 21, Res. #742 (VIII), cited in SADY, supra note 104,
at 78.
124. 8 U.N. GOAR, Supp. 17, p. 21. Res. # 742 (VIII). The United States transmitted
information on the following territories: Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii,
Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands.
125. Id. pp. 77-81.
126. 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp.'No. 17, p. 21, Res. # 742 (vIII).
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when put into historical perspective, the territories "whose
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government"
becomes clear.
The non-self-governing territories provision was derived from
the "native inhabitants" provision of the League of Nations
Covenant. 127 Under the League provision, members agreed to
"undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants
under their control." 12 This clearly indicated the universal ap-
plication of the international trust principle to all native peoples
wherever situated. 129
The non-self-governing territories provision has only been ap-
plied to 74 areas that United Nations members have voluntarily
placed under the system.13 The limitation of the non-self-
governing territories provision to areas voluntarily submitted is
contrary to the intention of the United Nations Charter.' 3' This
provision was intended to apply automatically to all territories
within its definition. 32 Due to the self-executing nature of this
provision, and the obligation to transmit information, the United
Nations can attempt to expand its application to all territories
within its purview.
There are two ways to expand the application of the non-self-
governing territories provision.133 Article 73(e) requires that
members transmit information to the Secretary-General. '
Because the Secretary-General is required to receive this informa-
tion, he is thereby authorized to insist that he receive it. Other-
wise, the Secretary-General would be unable to fulfill his duties.
A second method would again arise from the obligation to
transmit information under article 73(e). In article 2 members
undertake to "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them" in the Charter. For a violation of these principles a
member may be expelled. 35 To determine whether the principles
of the Charter in article 2 are being violated the General
Assembly must be able to discuss whether obligations under arti-
cle 73(e) are being fulfilled. This is authorized by article 10.
127. League of Nations Covenant art. 23(b). See HALL, supra note 123, at 223.
128. Id.
129. TOUSSIANT, supra note 103, at 10.
130. For a list of the territories, see SADY, supra note 104, at 80.
131. TousslANT, supra note 103, at 229.
132. Id.
133. These arguments are also presented in TOuSSiANT, supra note 103, at 230-32.
134. U.N. Charter art. 73(e).
135. Id. art. 6.
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Under article 10 the General Assembly is authorized to discuss
any matter within the scope of the Charter, and to make recom-
mendations to members on such matters.' 36 The right of the
General Assembly to discuss such matters is limited only by the
"domestic jurisdiction" clause.'37 However, the "domestic
jurisdiction" clause would only apply to certain "matters" within
the domestic jurisdiction of a member and would not extend to the
discussion of the territories themselves. 38 Furthermore, where
there is an obligation to act,' 39 the recommendation of the
General Assembly has the character of a decision and is not mere
advice to members. ,0 Given the derivation of the non-self-
governing territories provision from the "native inhabitants"
clause of the League covenant, the transmission of information
on the native inhabitants of American is a proper area for discus-
sion.
Since the 1950s little has been written about the application of
the international trust to American Indians.'" However, there
has been only one major argument advanced against such ap-
plication. It has been argued that the international trust was not
intended to apply to British possessions where the white settlers
achieved independence.' 42 The British settlements in Africa and
Malaya, where the international trust has been applied, are thus
distinguished from the British settlements in the United States
and Canada. 43
The weakness of the argument is suggested by the noted excep-
tion of South Africa, which is in this regard analogous to the
United States-Indian relationship.' 4 The major distinction be-
tween South Africa and the United States is the ratio of Euro-
136. Id. art. 10
137. Id. art 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state .. .") (emphasis added).
138. TousSIANr, supra note 103, at 231.
139. Transmit information under article 73(e).
140. ToussANT, supra note 103, at 230-31.
141. G. HALL, THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRusT RELATIONSHIP 54-55 (1979); Ryan, supra
note 86:
142. Green, North America's Indians and the Trusteeship Concept, ANGLO-AM. L.
Rev. 137 (1975), reprinted with changes in 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 104, Trusteeship and
Canada's Indians, (1976-77).
143. Green, supra note 142, at 137.
144. Id. Additionally, while focusing on the trusteeship system, Green fails to address
some of the important differences between it and the non-self-governing territories provi-
sion. See notes 111-140 and accompanying text supra.
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pean settlers to indigenous people.'4 5 This distinction should have
no effect on the rights of the indigenous people. Notably, even
South Africa is setting up independent black states in response to
international pressure.'
4 6
Conclusion
The domestic trust relationship between Indians and the United
States, like those that have previously existed throughout the
world, has repeatedly proven itself unable to protect the rights of
native inhabitants.' 47 The Indians' right to real self-determination
has been denied.' 4 Under domestic law, Indian land can be taken
without consent'4 9 or even compensation.' 50 The federal govern-
ment as trustee remains unaccountable for acknowledged
breaches of trust duties 5
The international trust exists to remedy problems inherent in
domestic trust relationships.152 It recognizes the native in-
habitants' right to develop self-government. 153 The international
trust also promotes accountability. 'i1
Application of international trust principles beyond their pre-
sent scope has been proposed by a number of writers.' 5 The
145. Id.
146. Self-Determination-South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANs. L.
185 (1978).
147. ToussiANT, supra note 103, at 3-14; SADY, supra note 104, at 3-14; EL-AYOUTY,
supra note 99, at 3-15.
148. Clinebell & Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native
Americans Under International Law, 27 BUF. L. Rv. 669 (1977-78). See note 73 supra.
149. See notes 54-61 supra.
150. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See note 24 supra.
151. See notes 76-83 supra.
152. See note 104 supra.
153. See notes 107 and 112 supra.
154. See note 103 supra.
155. Franck & Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8
N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 331 (1975-76); Self-Determination and World Public Order:
Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1975-76); Carey,
Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era: The Case of Quebec, 1 A.S.I.L.S.L.J. 37
(1977); Tibet and the Rights to Self-Determination, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 279 (1979); The
Logic of Session, 89 YALE L.J. 802 (1980); Northern Ireland and the United Nations, 19
INT. & CoMP. L.Q. 483; L. Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, printed in
Reisman & Weston, TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HuMAN DIGNITY, 198, 205 (1976):
"Among those who have recently claimed the right to self-determination are the Ger-
mans, Koreans, Vietnamese, the Biafrans or Ibos, the South Sudanese, the Baltic peoples,
the Formosans (Taiwanese), the Somalis, the Kurds, and Armenians, Germans of
Rumania, Scots in Scotland, the Catalans and the Basque people in Spain, the Bangalis,
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United Nations has taken the first step in this direction 3 6 and ex-
pressed a commitment toward these goals. ' It is urged that ef-
forts continue in the direction of breaking down the last barriers
to the universal application of international trust principles to all
dependent peoples to bring "to a speedy and unconditional end
colonialism in all of its manifestations."5 8
Catholics in Northern Ireland, French Canadians in Quebec, the Welsh people, the
Lebanese people, Croats in Yugoslavia, the Tibetan people, and many former colonial
people in Asia and Africa who have only recently achieved independence."
156. "In February, 1977, the [International Indian] Treaty Council was granted
Category II status within the United Nations becoming the first native people's organiza-
tion to receive international recognition in the 20th century." 3 AM. IND. J., No. 9, at 4
(1977).
157. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Ter-
ritories, General 14 Dec. 1960. U.N. GAOR, XV, Supp. 16 (A/4684), Res. # 1514 (XV),
pp. 66-67.
158. Id. This includes "Soviet imperialism, traditional colonialism, racism, and other
forms of domination by one people over another." Final communique of the Conference
at Bandung, New York Times (Apr. 25, 1955), p. 6; quoted in SADY, supra note 104.
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